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The aim of this paper will be to analyse the social and political opportunity 
structures available to the Muslim population domiciled within the Republic 
of Ireland (ROI) and to assess how the incentives and disincentives of these 
structures impact on the individual choice selection of either a national or 
transnational identity. Critical stress will be placed on the role of the nation 
state for designing political structures that are exclusionary, as compared to 
the more open and accessible civil and social opportunities that exist. 
Notably, the political opportunity structure is recognised as exclusionary by 
the identification of a civic stratification of the Muslim community into 
citizens and denizens. This exclusionary institutional system is designed and 
perpetuated by the Irish nation state. The paper will then move onto a critical 
analysis of these political exclusionary structures within the Irish political 
community with particular emphasis on cosmopolitan theory, which aims to 
transcend the a-moral norms of the existing Westphalian state system and to 
create new modalities of dialogic communities that stop exclusion and civic 
stratification and enable denizens to enter the national political realm.  
Firstly, the chapter provides background information on the Muslim 
population in the Republic of Ireland, which has been relatively ignored in 
European Muslim studies. Such limited research of the Irish context has 
been perpetuated by a relatively small population of domiciled Muslims and 
a continuing lack of qualitative and quantitative data that may form the basis 
of much needed academic insight. Due to these limitations, this paper has 
had to make some reluctant trade-offs. Specifically, in accordance with 
research conducted by Koopmans and Statham into civic pluralist polities
1
 
(of which the ROI has been categorised below), the heterogeneous Muslim 
community will not be assessed according to its ethnic cleavages but as a 
holistic entity. Certainly, in time with continuing research and more 
accessible data, narrowing the focus to Muslim ethnic cleavages will be an 
academic priority for the Irish Muslim-studies field.  
Secondly, the chapter will discuss the Irish social and political 
opportunity structures such as the political system; racism within Irish 
society; naturalisation and electoral franchise; and the educational system. 
The political and social opportunity structure has not been narrowed to the 
Muslim context per se but has been developed in a broad manner that may 
be inferred onto all migrants and third country nationals living within the 
Irish state.  Muslim reactions to these structures have been presented through 
the limited academic work that exists, official organisational documents and 
newspaper coverage from the Irish Times, the most influential broadsheet in 
the country. As mentioned, the data available remains sparse in terms of 
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 Koopmans and Statham (2001) have stated within their content analysis studies on migrant claims-making 
that: ‘inclusive citizenship regimes direct migrant identities away from the national and ethnic cleavages of 
their homelands’ (p.93) and towards a Muslim identity. We will deal more comprehensively with this topic 
of political opportunity structures below. 
European research already presented in this academic field and this chapter 
begins to fill this gap.   
Lastly, the paper will narrow its focus on one preeminent form of 
exclusion identified from the social and political opportunity structure: that 
of the exclusion of denizens to vote in national elections within the Republic 
of Ireland. This exclusionary practice will be critically analysed using a 
cosmopolitan perspective that will emphasize the moral rigidity of the nation 
state system in identifying new ways of incorporating political communities 
that have national and transnational links. Particular emphasis will be placed 
on the cosmopolitan theories of Andrew Linklater and on the dialogic ethics 
of Jürgen Habermas.  
 
Background to the Muslim Community in Ireland
2
 
Demographically, at present, the Muslim population of the Republic of 
Ireland is officially calculated at 32,539, which represents an increase of 
69.9 percent in the Muslim population since the previous census of 2002. 
This population has a male-female division of 19,372 and 13,167 
respectively and is considerably young in age with 9,979 aged between 1-14; 
10,140 aged between 15-29; 11,993 aged between 30-59 and lastly, 427 
aged between 60-85 plus.
3
 
It must be recognised that the Muslim population within the ROI. is 
extremely heterogeneous, containing over fifty different nationalities and 
incorporating regional links to Europe, (South) Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East. Sunni sects predominate, whilst two thousand Shia are also 
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 The primary reference to this section unless otherwise stated is Flynn (2006). 
3
 For the above statistics, see Central Statistics Office (CSO, 2010).  
represented
4
. In parallel with other European countries, immigration to the 
ROI was initiated due to economic and professional necessity. However, in 
contrast to the European experience, the first migrants to Ireland were 
medical students, practicing doctors, aircraft mechanics and businessmen. 
Muslims are well-represented in occupations in the health, sales and 
personal care/child care areas. In terms of geographical spread within 
Ireland, the census figures of 2006 indicates a balance between Dublin 
(17,330 pop.) and non-Dublin (15,209 pop.). Moreover, outside Dublin, the 
Muslim population has a tendency to reside in regional city locations or 
towns with populations over 5000.
5
 
Notably, Muslim communities have developed in towns that contain 
economic resources that fit general Muslim occupational trends. For 
example, Cavan town has a Muslim population of 252, who benefit from a 
close proximity to a hospital that provides medical services for the wider 
provincial area. Also, in county Kerry, the small town of Tralee has a 
significant Muslim population of 522, who avail of the important tourist 
industry in which the sales and services markets thrive. The county 
newspaper of Kerry published an article on the Muslim population increase 
by stating that ‘in the county capital Islam has overtaken Protestantism to 
become the second most practised religion in the town’.6 Interestingly, not 
all economic migration within Ireland has been guided by pre-existing 
national determinants such as medical needs and tourism. In County Mayo, 
the town of Ballyhuanis has, for a thirty year period, encouraged the 
continued operation of a halal meat slaughtering plant, which provided halal 
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 See www.shiamusliminireland.com, Retrieved on 7
th
 November 2009.  
5
 For the above statistics, see Central Statistics Office (CSO, 2010).  
6
 See ‘Muslim Population in Kerry Doubles in Four Years’ .The Kerryman. 5th December 2007. Available 
from www.kerryman.ie. 
meat to the global Muslim market. Prior to the first Gulf war and subsequent 
economic sanctions, the United Meat Packers (UMP) firm in Ballyhuanis 
was the second largest meat-processing firm in the country providing halal 
meat to the Middle Eastern market, particularly Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
UMP was established by Pakistani entrepreneur Sher Mohammed Rafique 
and employed the majority of the Muslim population in the town; however, 
due to economic embargoes the company lost its profitability and eventually 
closed down. Today, a new company called Iman Casings in Ballyhuanis 
processes lamb casings and employs the Muslims in the town, which now 
stand at 146 individuals.
7
 
Historically, the Republic of Ireland’s Muslim community traces its 
origins back to the late 1950s, when a small group of students attending the 
Royal College of Surgeons Dublin, established a committee to organise 
religious needs for the Muslim holidays and weekly Friday prayers (Arabic: 
Jumaa). From 1969 to 1976, after national and international fundraising, this 
expanding community established the first Islamic centre in the ROI, located 
in the South Dublin city centre. However, by 1983, with the continued 
expansion of the Muslim community, the Harrington Street premises was 
sold and personal and international donations
8
 were utilised in order to buy a 
larger property at nearby 163 South Circular Road. Since then, this has 
become the home of the Dublin City Mosque along with the Islamic 
Foundation of Ireland (IFI). The foundation’s registered members elect a 
new Council (Arabic: Majlis al-Shura) annually and it abides by a written 
constitution. Sheikh Yayha al-Hussein has presided as imam of Dublin City 
Mosque since the move to the South Circular Road.   
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 See ‘Entrepreneur Returns to Help Mayo’s Muslims’ 24th July 2004 & ‘Immigration has benefited 
Ballyhuanis’ 16th May 2000. The Irish Times. Available from www.irishtimes.com/search/index.html 
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 Donations were received from the Qatari and Kuwaiti authorities. 
From the early 1990s onwards, the Muslim population in the Republic 
of Ireland increased dramatically due to influx of refugees from Bosnia, 
Somalia and Albania who were fleeing their war-torn countries. In addition, 
by the end of the decade, there was a substantial increase in asylum seeker 
applications from a number of countries in Africa and the Middle East.
9
 This 
increase in the Muslim population brought with it issues relating to physical 
and religious space (i.e. the limits of space within existing mosques, the lack 
of Islamic education and facilities outside of the Dublin metropolitan area). 
In November 1996, the second purpose built mosque in the ROI,
10
 the 
Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (ICCI), was officially opened with the 
President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, in attendance. This large purpose built 
mosque, located in the middle class Dublin suburb of Clonskeagh, was 
initially administered by the IFI but was subsequently then managed  by the 
Al-Maktoum Foundation, which is closely linked to and receives funding 
from authorities in the United Arab Emirates. The switching of 
administrative responsibilities from the IFI to the Al-Maktoum foundation 
has caused a certain amount of friction between individuals within the two 
organisations. Since the 1990s, advances have been made in opening and 
increasing the space available for the Muslim community not only in Dublin 
but throughout the island. At present in Dublin, there are three large 
mosques
11
 and approximately eight prayer halls varying in size. Four of 
those prayer halls are located on university campuses. In the rest of Ireland, 
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 Islam in Dublin. (2010). Islam and Muslims in Ireland. Retrieved on 15
th
 October, 2009. Available from 
www.muslimtents.com/islamindublin/ireland/htm.  
10
 In 1987, the Ballyhuanis Mosque became the first purpose built mosque in the Republic of Ireland. 
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 The second purpose built mosque in Dublin is the Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre [Hussainia], Milltown 
Bridge Dublin 14. 
there at least 16 designated small mosques and prayer halls. Notably, the 




Social and Political Opportunity Structure 
Rainer Baubock (2006) defined the political and social opportunity structure 
as consisting of ‘laws that allocate different statuses and rights to various 
groups of migrants and formally constrain or enable their activities, of 
institutions of government and public administration in which migrants are 
or are not represented, of public policies that address migrants claims, 
concerns and interests or do not, and of a public culture that is inclusive and 
accepts diversity or that supports national homogeneity and a myth of shared 
ancestry’ (p.10). Furthermore, Baubock presents the reason behind analysing 
these structures. He states that ‘the point of analysing a political [and social] 
opportunity structure is to identify institutional incentives and disincentives 
that help to explain migrant choices of political strategies’ (2006, p.11). This 
framework is helpful in outlining broad advantages and disadvantages for 
the domiciled Muslim community and in identifying exclusionary practices 
that may affect the selection of a national or transnational identity. 
  
Irish Political System and the Absence of a Right-Wing Party 
Academically, the Irish parliamentary system has been categorised as sui 
generis in composition and very much counter to the systems that exist in 
the rest of Europe. The Irish political system is comprised of two centre-
right nationalist (republican) parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, followed by 
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 For a list of mosques in the Republic of Ireland, refer to www.islaminireland.com/irish_mosques.html. 
a centrist Labour Party
13
 and smaller left of centre political groupings such 
as Sinn Fein and the Green Party. The populist political strategies of the 
Fianna Fail Party have secured its clear domination of the political landscape 
since its formation in 1927, while the proportional representational (PR-
STV)
14
 electoral system allows for the smaller parties to maintain some form 
of competition and even participate in government as part of a coalition 
arrangement. 
Uniquely and in contrast to most of the European political landscape 
today, the Irish political system is devoid of any radical right (RR) party 
such as has been identified in the United Kingdom (UK) with the British 
National Party (BNP), in France with the Front National (NF) or in Denmark 
with the Danish People’s Party (Danish: Dansk Folkeparti, DF). These right-
wing parties have promoted, with varying success, xenophobic immigration 
policies and challenged the pre-existing political consensus. Moreover, of 
growing concern is the increase in anti-Muslim rhetoric emanating from 
parties like the Danish People’s Party (Rydgen, 2004). Certainly, the 
absence of a RR party within the Irish political system creates a more 
positive social and political space in which the Muslim community can 
participate without the added psychological and physical barriers that right-
wing elements try to promote and enforce. Academics, such as Garner and 
O’Malley, have sought to explain this unique absence of right wing 
influence. Although a number of factors are outlined to account for this, 
most academics attribute this characteristic to the nationalist ideology that 
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 Arguably, the Labour Party may be categorised as ‘centrist’ due to its social conservatism and lack of 
general support within the working class itself.  
14
 Importantly, Kingsley (1996) has recognised the limited potential within the proportional 
representational system for electoral block voting (a political strategy deployed by geographically 
concentrated Muslims in the United Kingdom) which limits the ‘political potential’ of settlers ‘should they 
seek to act in unity’ (pp. 129-142). 
permeates the Irish political system. For example, Garner (2007) states that 
the norms of the Irish political system ‘are not those of the European 
mainstream [but are in fact]…populist and nationalist’ (p.114). Furthermore, 
O’Malley (2008) emphasises the unique populist character of Irish 
nationalism by stating that ‘nationalism in Ireland cannot easily sit with anti-
immigrant bigotry, so it is less likely that a nationalist party in Ireland could 
be xenophobic’ (p.974). Such explanations are convincing, but should be 
supplemented by referring to the Proclamation of the Irish Republic
15
 (Irish: 
Poblacht Na hEireann), which articulates the viewpoints of the founding 
fathers of the state and was signed by the leaders of the 1916 Easter Rising 
against British colonial rule. Notably, this document guarantees religious 
and civil rights and also emphasises the need for the equalisation of the 
enforced colonial barriers of divide and rule.  The third and fourth 
paragraphs proclaim: 
 
‘The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every 
Irishman and Irishwoman. The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberties, 
equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to 
pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, 
cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences 
carefully fostered by an alien government, which have divided a minority from 
the majority in the past. 
 
Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a 
permanent National Government representative of the whole of Ireland and 
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 We would contend that although the Proclamation of the Irish Republic is not an official document with 
legal standing within modern Ireland, its historical significance has moral and psychological resonance for 
the Irish nation at a collective and individual level. In a similar fashion to liberté, égalité, fraternité in 
France. However, it is a fact that a large percentage of Protestant families and individuals left Ireland after 
Independence. Certainly, Soysal (1994) has highlighted a term coined by Stephen Leibfried: ‘There is 
always an ‘implementation deficit’, a discrepancy between formal rights and their praxis’ (p.134).  
elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provisional Government, 
hereby constitute, will administer the civil and military affairs of the Republic in 
trust for the people’.16 
 
Certainly, within its historical context, paragraph three of the Proclamation 
of Independence may be interpreted as guaranteeing a republican freedom to 
a homogenous entity (the Irish people) and to a certain extent appeasing and 
including protestant elements within Irish society. Notably, the Irish flag 
signifies this appeasement to the Protestant minority religion of the time (the 
colours green and orange linked by the white middle indicating peace 
between the Catholic majority and Protestant minority). Presently, in the 
context of a multicultural Ireland with an expanding Muslim population, the 
Proclamation of 1916 still proclaims religious and civil rights for all the 
people of Ireland, whether of a majority or minority group. It also highlights 
Ireland’s strong opposition to colonialism’s divide and rule policy, which 
manifested a religious divide in Ireland between Catholics and Protestants.
17
 
Returning to the absence of a right-wing party in the Irish political system, it 
must be recognised that all of Ireland’s present political parties (except the 
Green Party) trace their political roots back to the Proclamation of 
Independence and its political prescriptions. That is not to say that a RR 
party can never exist within the Irish political arena, but that the political 
environment originally cast by the 1916 Proclamation makes the evolution 
and acceptance of such parties much more difficult.     
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 Proclamation of the Irish Republic (Poblacht Na hEireann), 24
th
 April 1916. Available from 
http://www.libraryireland.com/HullHistory/Appendix3b.php.  
17
 Notably for the last 27 years, the Republic of Ireland has annually sponsored a United Nations (U.N.) 
resolution condemning religious intolerance. See ‘Israel to block Irish U.N. religion motion’. The Irish 
Times, 12
th
 December 2003. Available from www.irishtimes.com/search/index.html. 
Racism in Ireland 
Although the social and political opportunity structure is positively uplifted 
by the absence of a RR party within the Irish political system, as in other 
European countries, racism still continues to affect the Muslim and other 
ethnic communities in Ireland. The National Consultative Committee on 
Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), in its role as the Irish National Focus 
Point (NFP) for the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia (EUMC), provides detailed six monthly reports on racist 
incidents which have occurred and were reported in the ROI Notably, after 
the plane attacks on New York, NCCRI and the Equality Authority (2001) 
reported that at least ‘one fifth (20%) of all 41 incidents recorded between 
May and October 2001, [were] directly related to September 11
th’. The 
report highlights the nature of the racist attacks as unorganised acts such as 
abusive phone calls to mosques, verbal insults directed at Muslim women in 
Islamic dress and sensationalist newspaper and media reporting, which verge 
on being categorised as stereotypical and racist. Since 2001, the NCCRI has 
continued to document racist incidents within Ireland. In 2005, 119 racist 
incidents were reported, followed by 65 in 2006, 54 in 2007 and rising again 
to 106 in 2008 (NCCRI, 2005-2008). Due to recessionary times, since the 
end of 2008, the Irish government has decided to stop funding the NCCRI 
and to end the National Action Plan against Racism. Philip Watt, director of 
the NCCRI, publically criticised such cutbacks by stating that there is now a 
‘significant vacuum in Government policy arising from the fact that there is 
no longer an expert body to advise on anti-racism and integration and no 
longer a dedicated plan and funding line focused on dealing with these 
issues’.18 Certainly, such cutbacks in expert monitoring of racist incidents in 
the ROI may have a detrimental effect on the development of the Muslim 
communities social and political opportunity structure in the future. 
 
Naturalisation, the Electoral Franchise and Political Participation 
Political integration is another important element of the social and political 
opportunity structure in that ‘it refers to access to political status, rights 
opportunities and representation for immigrants and an equalisation of these 
conditions between native and immigrant populations’ (Baubock, 2006, 
p.11). It essentially analyses the level of structural integration of a given 
community. Naturalisation and voting franchise rights vary significantly 
within the European community and are still determined by the individual 
member states own particular policies towards political inclusion for citizens 
and third country nationals. The Republic of Ireland has accommodating and 
inclusive policies concerning naturalisation and the franchise to vote 
compared to other European member states. Notably, in Ireland, a minimum 
residence of four years is required for naturalisation with a toleration of dual 
nationality accepted under certain conditions.
19
 
In terms of the political opportunity structure, Koopmans and 
Statham’s (2000, 2001) content analysis work on migrant claims-making, 
led to the development of four ideal-typical national models of citizenship 
and incorporation. The model combined two citizenship elements, firstly, 
Brubaker’s (1992) conception of ius sanguinis, which refers to an ethno-
cultural community based on common descent and cultural traditions and ius 
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 See ‘Budget Cutbacks Weaken State’s Capacity to Combat Racism’. The Irish Times, 19th November 
2008. Available from www.irishtimes.com/search/index.html.  
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 See Waldrauch H. Annex –Table 1: Acquisition of nationality at birth and by naturalization in Western 
Europe (15 old E.U. member states, Norway and Switzerland.  In Baubock (2006, pp. 106-107).  
soli, which refers to a civic community adhering to common political values 
(and institutions) and residence within the state territory. The second 
element concerns the state’s particular cultural obligations and strategy for 
including migrants into the political community. Two strategies are 
identified: assimilationist and cultural pluralist. Assimilationism refers to a 
public sphere that requires new members of the political community to 
conform and convert to the dominant national culture. On the contrary, 
within cultural pluralist receiving states migrants have the right to retain 
their ethnic, cultural and religious differences. By combining these two 
elements of citizenship, Koopmans and Statham (2000, 2001) developed 
four ideal-typical national models of citizenship and incorporation – these 
are: ethnic segregationism, ethnic assimilationism, civic republicanism and 
civic pluralism. These distinct types of citizenship and incorporation can 
facilitate the identification of the two-way relationship between European 
state and its migrant population. Ethnic segregation has been best 
exemplified by Germany, which has in the past pursued policies that make it 
difficult for guestworkers and foreigners to naturalise and enter the political 
community. Therefore, Ius sanguinis naturalisation was applicable. 
However, by 2000, with the introduction of new citizenship laws, Germany 
made a radical transition from ethno-cultural segregationism to 
assimilationism. This has put more emphasis on the need for migrants (who 
are legally capable of naturalising) to assimilate fundamentally into the 
dominant German culture. In fact, Minkenberg (2003) has declared that 
Germany now has one of the most liberal nationality laws in Europe, by 
accommodating conditional ius soli provision and carrying out 150,000 
naturalisations per year. 
Civic republicanism is best exemplified by France, which has an open 
access to citizenship through ius soli but whose public sphere ascribes to a 
universal cultural model that does not recognise ethno-cultural groups as 
public entities. In fact ‘communautarisme’ is reviled in French political 
culture.
20
 Lastly, civic pluralism is identified with countries such as Sweden, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Like France, this type has an open 
access to citizenship through ius soli, but contra to the civic republican type 
recognises the cultural differences and the expression of that cultural identity 
in the public sphere. Notably, differences exist between the Netherlands and 
the U.K, in that the Netherlands has been identified as more multicultural by 
giving religious and ethnic groups state support for their organisations and 
education. This stance is related to the Pillar system (Dutch: zuilenstelsel) 
that has historically existed within the Dutch society.
21
 However, in recent 
times, there are signs that the Netherlands may be moving to a more 
assimilationist approach by introducing naturalisation tests in culture, history 
and language. According to Koopmans and Statham (2000; 2001), the UK’s 
relationship to its migrant population has in effect been racialised by a 
‘state-sponsored race relation industry’ which has categorised sections of the 
migrant population as ‘black’ or ‘Asian’. Interestingly, unlike German 
Muslim migrants who make claims via their ethnic affiliation. Muslim 
migrant claims-making in the Netherlands and the UK, is overwhelmingly 
presented through a ‘Muslim’ identity. Within the UK, this is all the more 
pronounced by the fact that Race Relations Act 1976 does not cover 
religious discrimination. As Koopmans and Statham (2001) succinctly state: 
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 See ‘Maverick for whom France is one and divisible’. The Irish Times, 23rd  September 2000. Available 
from www.irishtimes.com/search/index.html. 
21
 For an historical and modern day perspective of the influence of the Pillar system in Dutch society, see 
Gowricharn & Mungra (1996). The politics of integration in the Netherlands. In Shadid & van Koningsveld 
(eds.) (1996).  
 ‘inclusive citizenship regime[s] such as those of Britain and Netherlands not only 
affect the degree to which identity groups make homeland-oriented claims, but 
shape the very identities of these groups. As a result, Turks, Moroccans, or 
Pakistani in the Netherlands and Britain to an important extent are no longer 
visible in the public sphere a such, but appear as Muslims, general speakers for 
minorities, or, in the British Case, as representatives of the racial group of Asians 
[…thus] inclusive citizenship regimes direct migrant identities away from the 
national and ethnic categories of their homelands’ (p.93). 
 
In relation to the Irish context, ius soli citizenship rights, although not 
automatically conferred since the Citizenship referendum in 2004,
22
 are 
given to the second generation if one parent is resident in the state for at 
least three years. To acquire citizenship through marriage, an individual 
must by resident in the state for two years and have been married to an Irish 
citizen for at least three years (Baubock, 2006).
23
 In terms of placement of 
Koopmans and Statham’s typology of citizenship and incorporation, the ROI 
would be placed in the civic pluralist camp in between the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom. In other words, within the ROI there is an open access 
to citizenship through ius soli and recognition of the cultural differences that 
exist within society and an acceptance of the expression of cultural and 
religious identity in the public sphere. In contrast to the UK and similar to 
the Netherlands, Ireland has incorporated its migrants with more emphasis 
on religious recognition by funding religious schools and educational 
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 ‘On 11 June 2004 the government [of the ROI] asked the electorate to vote in a referendum to amend 
Article 9 of the Constitution to remove birth-right citizenship from children born in Ireland who do not 
have at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or who is entitled to Irish Citizenship […] 79.8 percent of 
the electorate voted in favour of the government’s proposal’ (Lentin 2007, p.610).  
23
 For a concise table of naturalisation and franchise rights across Europe refer to note 19. 




In spite of a relatively open and liberal civic pluralism, the ROI, 
according to the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, 2010), has the 
least secure long-term residence policy for third country nationals (who do 
not wish to take up Irish citizenship) in Europe, due to the fact that ‘security 
to live in Ireland for the long-term is discretionary and entirely based on 
their security of employment’. The same source reports that class inequality 
also permeates the Irish long-term residence policy as regular workers have 
to work in Ireland for five years to get a renewable work permit (stamp 4) 
and eight years to get an indefinite work permit (stamp 6) whilst 
strategically important occupations (with incomes above €60,000) can be 
fast-tracked by the Green Card system (MIPEX, 2010). 
In terms of franchise rights for third country nationals, the Irish state 
was one of the first European countries to institutionalise local voting rights 
based on residency (ius domicili) rather than on citizenship. The electoral act 
of 1963 and the subsequent amendment of 1972 gave the local electoral 
franchise to third country nationals over 18 years of age and ordinarily 
resident in a particular constituency (Whelan, 2000, p.8). In common with 
nearly all other European states (except the United Kingdom), the national 
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 Centuries) reduced Catholic rights and subsequently significantly reduced Catholic 
land-holdings on the island. See ‘Muslim MP calls for religious equality Law’ .The Independent [U.K], 16th 
September 2008. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/muslim-mp-calls-for-
religious-equality-law-931982.html . On the 1st October 2010, the Equality Act will come into force in the 
U.K. An element of this act is recognition of religious discrimination in line with previous European 
directives. 




In terms of the Muslim communities’ social and political space, the 
ROI’s naturalisation and local election franchise policies are liberal and 
inclusive compared to most other European states. However, the Muslim 
community in Ireland has now become electorally stratified:  there are 
Muslims who are citizens
26
 and may vote in all Irish elections and referenda 
(local, national and European); there are Muslims who are E.U. citizens
27
 
and may vote in local and European elections; and third country nationals of 
the Islamic faith who as residents of a constituency may vote in local 
elections for that area only. In an influential study on democracy, citizenship 
and the nation state, Thomas Hammer (1990) viewed and categorised 
resident third country nationals who enjoyed a secure and peaceful life 




 of the Muslim community into citizens and 
denizens may inhibit the ability of the community to participate politically in 
a ‘conventional’ way (i.e. via electoral voting and representation). 
Alternatively, to act collectively in its interests, the Muslim community may 
rely more on ‘unconventional’ means of political participation (i.e. via trade 
unions, lobbying, community committees and Muslim organisations). 
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 There are approximately 9, 761 Irish citizens belonging to the Islamic faith. This number comprises 
individuals who have decided to naturalise, Irish citizens who have converted to the Islamic faith and Irish-
born Muslim children. See Central Statistics Office (C.S.O, 2010). Census 2006 - ‘Volume 13 – Religion’. 
Available from www.cso.ie.  
27
 There are approximately 2,544 European citizens of Islamic faith in the ROI, of which 620 are U.K 
citizens who may vote in the Irish national elections. Approximations from Central Statistics Office (C.S.O, 
2010). Census 2006 - Combined ‘Nationality’ dataset and ‘Volume 13 – Religion’. Available from 
www.cso.ie.  
28
 A term developed by Lockwood (1996).  
Interestingly, citizenship and denizenship stratification within the Irish 
community may produce significant variations in political integration, which 
may lead to higher or lower voting levels in local elections. Research by 
Fennema and Tille (2001) in the Netherlands has shown that the Turkish 
denizen community participates strongly in local elections in contrast to 
other migrant communities such as the Surinamese and Antilleans, who have 
gained Dutch citizenship via colonial affiliation (p.39). 
Current evidence shows a lack of conventional political representation 
by Muslims at the national and local electoral levels in Ireland.  A brief 
overview of Muslims running in Irish elections shows that only one Muslim 
has ever been elected to the national parliament - Indian-born Dr. Bhamjee 
Moosajee, a Labour backbench parliamentarian (Irish: Teachta Dala, TD) 
for County Clare after the 1992 general election.
29
 In the 2009 local 
elections
30
, only four Muslim individuals
31
 could be identified as having 
competed for a council seat within their respective local areas.
32
 
Surprisingly, although there is an open franchise in local elections, there 
tends to be an absence of participation at the candidate level within the 
Muslim community. Weeks and Quinlivan (2009) explained such passivity 
by the fact that local elections, over the years within the ROI and in contrast 
to common European practice, have been weakened by a limited authority 
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 Dr. Bhamjee Moosajee declined to run again in the 1997 General Election but has continued to lobby on 
behalf of the Muslim community in County Clare. See ‘Council to Provide 20 Muslim Graves. The Irish 
Times, 12
th
 December 2007. Available from www.irishtimes.com/search/index.html.  
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 The June 2009 Local Elections incorporated 258 separate local elections to elect 1,627 local public 
representatives (Weeks and Quinlivan 2009, p.6). 
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  Shaheen Ahmed (F.F.) – Lucan 448 – 1st preference votes - Total vote 15,425 – Not Elected.  
     M. Ahmed (Ind.) – Waterford East – 130 1st preference votes – Total vote 10,094 – Not Elected.  
     Rashid Butt (Ind.) – Mullingar West – 185 1st preference votes – Total vote 13,526 – Not Elected.  
     Zahid Hussein (Ind.) – Castleknock – 136 1st preference votes – Total vote 29,622 – Not Elected. 
     Local election 2009 results available from http://electionsireland.org/results/local/2009local.cfm. 
32
 Further detailed quantitative and qualitative research is needed to discover individual Muslim voting 
patterns and party preferences within the ROI.   
range for local councils, budgetary dependence on the national government, 
a restrictive career path to the national political arena for local councillors
33
 
and a duel mandate
34
 tactic practiced by elected TDs to control the political 
space within local politics. The prohibition of dual mandate in 2003 may 




It has been argued that denizens should voluntarily naturalize to the recipient 
country citizenship in order to gain full political and electoral rights. 
However, in many circumstances, this is not possible due to family links, 
economic investment concerns or the policy advocated and followed by the 
sending state in terms of renunciation of citizenship. As Gianluca Parolin’s 
(2009) five-year study into Arab citizenship acknowledges: 
 
‘If the freedom to change nationality prevails, foreign naturalization automatically 
entails loss of nationality, whereas if perpetual allegiance proves stronger, loss of 
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 Many councillors hope to gain a party nomination to run in the national elections. However, a limited 
number of nominations are available, which may cause disappointment to many local councillors. Between 
2006 and 2008, eleven councillors resigned from the fifty-two seat Dublin City Council. See Weeks and 
Quinlivan (2009, p.169). 
34
 Duel Mandate refers to parliamentarians (TDs) holding a national seat alongside a seat on their local 
council. In 2002, of the 226 elected TDs, 138 were members of their local councils. This practice was 
prohibited by the 2003 Local Government Act (No.2). See Weeks and Quinlivan. (2009, pp.39-40). 
35
 However, multiple academic reports have shown that Irish political parties have been very slow to 
implement policies that incorporate immigrant party members and select immigrant electoral candidates. 
See Fanning, B., Mutawarasibo, F. & Chadmayo, N. (2004); Fanning, Shaw, O’Connell, & Williams. 
(2007); Fanning, O’ Boyle. & Shaw. (2009). All three reports are available from 
http://www.ucd.ie/mcri/publications.html .  
36
 Parolin (2009, p.108) also clarifies that ‘the punitive deprivation of nationality for having acquired 
foreign nationality without state permission is the main orientation of Gulf legislation’.   
The Irish Educational System and the Muslim Community
37
 
From the 1930s to the 1950s, the Catholic Church acquired a leading role 
within Irish society to the point where the Irish Constitution
38
 publically and 
lawfully acknowledged that position. Although not recognised as the official 
state religion, this strong relationship between church and state may be 
viewed as a necessary step in order to establish and formulate an Irish 
identity distinct to the British identity that had preceded Irish independence. 
The foundation and perpetuation of this nascent Irish identity was forged by 
the Catholic Church’s domination of the educational system. In 1972, a 
constitutional amendment was passed which recognised and respected 
religious practice but ensured the non-endowment of a particular religion. 
However, the Catholic Church continued to exert traditional conservative 
power within Irish society at large culminating in fierce debates between 
various elements of society in relation to issues of divorce, abortion
39
 and 
homosexuality. Notably, although the Irish constitution declared the 
separation between the various religious establishments and the state, the 
Catholic Church has continued to dominate the administration of education 
in Ireland with government support. The position of the Church in this 
regard has weakened in recent years. Even the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. 
Diarmuid Martin, publically acknowledged to the Irish Primary Principals 
Network (Dublin Network) that the Catholic monopoly of the Irish 
education system is an ‘historical hangover’ and that ‘a system in which 92 
percent of all primary schools [are] managed by the Catholic Church in a 
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 See ‘Muslims favour retaining abortion clause in the Constitution’. The Irish Times, 6th July 2000. 
Available from www.irishtimes.com/search/index.html. 




The Irish Constitution’s public recognition of religion and its 
amended statement not to endow any one particular religion has been 
positively acknowledged by the Irish-Muslim community. Furthermore, the 
ROI’s legacy of denominational and confessional education41 has also 
transferred educational and religious space to the Muslim Community. Such 
educational religious space is guaranteed by the Irish Constitution which 
acknowledges in Article 42.1 that ‘the primary and natural educator of the 
child is the family and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of 
parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious and moral, 
intellectual, physical and social education of their children’.42 
Similar to European citizenship policy, the practice of allowing 
Muslim communities religious educational freedom varies depending on 
particular member state laws and policies. As Brigitte Merechal (2003) has 
stated in relation to this pan-European issue:  
 
‘Only about half of the European countries have officially recognised and state-
supported Islamic schools. As a rule, those schools do not exist in countries with 
small Muslim populations of which Finland is an example’ (pp.50-51). 
 
If Finland is the example, Ireland is certainly the exception by the fact that 
the small Muslim population within the Irish state has utilised the use of two 
Muslim schools for over a twenty year period. The decade of the 1990s 
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 See ‘A New System of School Patronage’ and ‘Labour Calls on Minister to Review Church Role’. The 
Irish Times, 18
th
 June 2009. Available from www.irishtimes.com/search/index.html. 
41
 ‘Confessional’ refers to the fostering of commitment to a faith by religious education. As opposed to 
‘Non-Confessional’ which refers to distributing information about varying religions and their practices.   
42
Refer to note 38.  
heralded the continuing decline of the Catholic Church and an increase in 
the multicultural nature of the Irish nation as immigration levels increased. 
As has already been stated above, the increase in the Muslim population 
created the need for better facilities and for the creation of Islamic education 
with state support. In 1990, the first Muslim educational facilities in Ireland 
were established and administered by the IFI By 1993, with the construction 
of the ICCI near completion; the school was transferred to the more spacious 
facilities attached to the more modern mosque. This new complex not only 
contained a library, a centre for women, a restaurant, gym and an 
accommodation block but also three different Muslim schools: (1) the 
Muslim National School (Scoil Naisiunta Maslamach), which is 
administered by the IFI; (2) the Nur-Al-Huda Quranic School, which 
specialises in the memorisation of the Koran; and (3) a Libyan School, 
which follows the prescribed Libyan syllabus that is accepted throughout the 
Middle East. At the national school opening in 1993, the President of Ireland 
Mary Robinson spoke of the fact that it was ‘only natural that members of 
the Muslim community would feel the need for an education which would 
reflect the values of the Islamic faith’ (IFI, 1993). The Muslim National 
School follows the standard Irish school curriculum but allows for the school 
itself to administer religious instruction in the Islamic faith. The school 
caters to around 300 students of Sunni and Shia orientation. In 2001, a 
second state funded Muslim national school opened on the north side of 
Dublin. This school caters to approximately 100 students of Sunni 
orientation. Notably, in recent years, the north Dublin Muslim National 
School has received criticism from the Department of Education and the 
media in relation to high staff turnover levels, financial and enrolment 
irregularities and time-allocation to curriculum subjects.
43
 As administrators 
of the school since 2007, the IFI has sought to quickly remedy the above 
concerns by ensuring all outlying bills are paid to the Department of 
Education; by introducing a standard child protection policy and training; by 
introducing curricular plans for subjects such as maths, music and Irish; and 
regulating the time-allotted to curricular subjects to five hours and ten 
minutes per day [excluding religious education] (IFI, 2009).  
In addition, as in other European countries, the debate related to the 
wearing of the hijab has begun to surface in the ROI but in a contradictory 
manner to the discussion and policy in secular France
44
. The subject arose 
when the Irish Times newspaper printed a correspondence between the 
Department of Education and the principal of a school which concerned a 
lack of national policy on the wearing of the hijab within Irish schools.
45
 As 
media attention increased, the government issued a response in which the 
government categorically stated that ‘the issue of a school uniform is one for 
school authorities to design a policy on, following local consultations with 
the various members of the local community’ (Integration Unit of the Office 
of the Minister of Integration, 2009). In particular, the Minister for 
Integration, Conor Lenihan, referenced the Education Act (1998) which 
clarified the management role for school authorities as one of ‘respect for 
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 L’affaire du Foulard (the scarf affair) began in October 1989, when the headmaster of the College 
Gabriel Havez of Creil forbade three female Muslim students from attending class with their heads 
covered. On the advice of M. Daniel Youssouf Leclerq, a leading Muslim in France, the three girls defied 
the ban and thereby challenged the boundaries between public and private in the French state. The Conseil 
d’état or French Supreme Court attempted to balance the principles of läicité with religious freedom but 
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authorities.  On 10 February 2004, the French National Assembly banned the wearing of all religious 
symbols from public schools. For a more detailed analysis see Benhabib (2004, pp.184-194). 
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 See ‘Ministers agree common approach to wearing of Hijab’. The Irish Times, 3rd September 2008. 
Available from www.irishtimes.com/search/index.html. 
the diversity of values, beliefs, traditions, languages and ways of life in 
society’. In a submission letter to the Minister for Integration, the IFI 
strongly criticised the media for its sensationalist reporting and emphasised 
the unique space available in Ireland under its civic laws: 
 
‘the debate on the issue (of the hijab) has been typified by misunderstanding, myth and 
sensationalism. Opinions on Islam and its practice have been expressed by those 
unqualified to do so. Media pundits have expressed views on the wearing of the hijab 
without consulting any mainstream Islamic authority…all citizens no matter their 
ethnicity or religion should be entitled to the same expression of their beliefs. We have 
seen the road taken by some of our European neighbours where all religious symbols 
have been removed from schools and rich tapestry of difference lost’ (IFI, 2008).46 
 
The Political Exclusion of the Transnational ‘Other’ 
As has been shown above, the Irish social and political opportunity structure 
in Ireland creates and presents incentives and disincentives to the domiciled 
Muslim community. Incentives identified above relate to a political system 
whose origins and ethos are primarily based on an independence 
proclamation which aimed to establish universal civil rights and appease a 
religious minority; the related absence of a RR party; a shared colonial and 
migratory past; a toleration of dual citizenship; and the religious influence 
which predominated Irish society and educational institutions since the 
formation of the state. Importantly, the Irish state has a civic pluralist form 
of citizenship and incorporation that is reflected in the policy of ius soli and 
respect for cultural and religious difference. In terms of disadvantages, 
societal racism and the political stratification of the Muslim community into 
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 See also ‘Imam warns of Irish media hostility’. The Irish Times, 6th February 2006. Available from 
www.irishtimes.com/search/index.html. 
citizens and denizens and the restrictive implications for long term 
residence, predominate.
47
 It must also be recognised that civic stratification 
of the Muslim community contains a geographic-economic element. 
Notably, the institutional completeness of the Muslim community is strong 
primarily in the Dublin region and very much weaker outside of the 
metropolitan area. For example, the capital city contains three major 
mosques and affiliated organisations; the only Muslim educational facilities; 
and the economic resources of the Muslim community as well as close 
access to pre-existing social and political structures, which have historically 
resided within the capital. Consequently, the Muslim communities outside 
Dublin lack institutional completeness and access to advantageous social and 
political opportunity structures including mosque and social facilities (such 
as those within the ICCI), denominational education and economic 
independence. Subsequently, many of the regional Muslim communities are 
dependent and reliant upon the organisations based in Dublin, such as the IFI 
and ICCI.
48
   
However overall, in terms of the social and political structure, it can 
be argued that the institutionalised system of migrants’ political 
incorporation remains an arena of exclusion, which is controlled and 
maintained by the nation state. Thus, from a critical cosmopolitan 
perspective, it is possible to conclude that the power dynamic between 
nation states and migrants is one-sided. In other words, it is the nation state 
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 For a discussion about the duality of legitimacy claims by ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’ in terms of the 
2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum - see Fanning and Mutwarasibo (2007). Furthermore, Fanning (2004) 
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 See ‘Why Cork’s Muslim Community wants a Mosque’. The Irish Times, 24th February 1998. Available 
from www.irishtimes.com/search/index.html. 
system that has designed the process by which migrants select a citizen or 
denizen political identity. Fundamentally, civic stratification of the migrant 
political arena is a power mechanism actively employed by nation states in 
order to maintain power and control via selective exclusion of resident 
peoples from the national political community. By excluding distinct and 
differentiated people from substantial political participation, the nation state 
is actively restricting the domestic political identity of its denizen 
population, and consequently, refocusing the innate political dimension of 
the denizen towards unconventional political participation domestically and 
political involvement in a transnational sense. This becomes even more 
pronounced in the ROI, since local authorities have been disenfranchised 
from political and financial power. This is morally reprehensible from a 
cosmopolitan human rights perspective. This point is backed by an 
Intergovernmental Committee for Migration [ICM] conference: 
 
‘The migrant’s integration – apart from economic, social and cultural aspects – 
involves the question of political participation, since the migrant has a political 
dimension, as does any human being; his status in the receiving country cannot be 
divorced from this fundamental dimension’ (ICM Conference, 1976, p.78). 
 
Within the next section, I will extrapolate how the moral sensitivity of 
critical cosmopolitan theory, with a particular attention on Andrew 
Linklater’s transformative framework, can provide a remedy to continued 
and persistent civic stratification of the Muslim population into citizens and 
denizens and realign the performance of the Irish political community onto a 
more equitable and moral existence. I will also highlight my belief that the 
restriction of denizens from the full political community in the ROI is 
refocusing political action into nonconventional forms of political 
participation that has a national and transnational remit.  
 
Revisiting Linklater’s Transformation of the Political Community 
Critical Theory is essentially a social critique that has the specific goal of 
identifying exclusionary practices within human society and then attempting 
to emancipate individuals from those exclusionary practices. It aims to 
subvert neorealist immutability claims (Linklater, 2007).
49
 The strength of 
critical theory lies in its ability to ‘debunk conventional assumptions about 
the natural qualities of social structures or human behaviour and to identify 
countervailing and progressive tendencies within existing societies’ 
(Linklater, 1998, p.44).  
Andrew Linklater’s critical international theories are important in that 
they attempt to emancipate individuals within the domestic environment in 
order to affect change at the international level. Within The Transformation 
of the Political Community, Linklater theorises the continuing decline of the 
nation state’s monopoly over the political community and determines that 
the international anarchic community can be pacified by morally broadening 
the scope of the political community to include previously excluded actors 
such as aliens and non-citizens who are domiciled within the nation state. He 
highlighted the aim of his book by stating that the ‘central purpose is to 
reaffirm the cosmopolitan critique of the sovereign state-system and to 
defend the widening of the moral boundaries of political communities’ 
(Linklater, p.2). His theory, in line with Kant and Marx, is morally 
constituted, cosmopolitan, humanistic and against exclusion (Linklater, 
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 The immutability thesis claims that ‘social structures or forms of human action are natural and 
unchangeable rather than contingent and renegotiable’. Linklater (2007, pp.47-48).  
1990). It is also postmodern in that it rejects binary classifications, respects 
the fragmented composition of modern societies and aims to transcend the 
state structure. Linklater (1998) foresees the triple transformation of the 
political community. By this, he means a frame of mind and discursive 
practice that secures ‘greater respect for cultural differences, stronger 
commitments to the reduction of material inequalities and significant 
advances in universality [to] resist pressures to contract the boundaries of 
community’ (p.3).50 A central theoretical ambition is to disconnect the link 
between sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship, which has 
been propagated by the nation state and moulded into a stereotype of 
political community. 
Notably, for Linklater, the political community has been totalised by 
the sovereign powers over time. The nation state has monopolised the right 
to control the instruments of violence; the right to tax citizens; the ordering 
of political allegiance; the right to adjudicate disputes between citizens; and 
the right to represent citizens in the international arena (Linklater, 1998 
p.28). This totalising of the political community has maintained and 
legitimised the exclusion of outsiders and the overwhelming inclusion and 
protection of specific groups of insiders. This in itself stunts moral 
development within the community and perpetuates a moral democratic 
paradox in which the state on the one hand protects individuals but also 
excludes and disenfranchises ‘other’ individuals for reasons which cannot be 
morally accepted in the modern global era.  
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 In contra to the cosmopolitan perspective, communitarians such as Michael Walzer believe that citizens 
are inextricably linked to bounded communities through a shared historical experience and that nation 
states have ‘the right to decide who can become a member and who should be turned away’ (Linklater, 
2007, pp.109-112). See Walzer, M. (2002). Spheres of affection. In Nussbaum, M. (ed.), For love of 
country? Boston MA: Beacon Press.  
Within the totalised Irish community, it has been demonstrated that 
Muslim third country nationals are excluded from the full political 
community (as long as they remain within the realm of denizenship). David 
Held (1995) created the term nautonomy to refer to the ‘asymmetrical 
production and distribution of life-chances which limit and erode the 
possibilities of political action’ (p.171). Furthermore, social and political 
stratification is referenced as perpetuating exclusionary practices that form 
the ‘capability of groups to exclude ‘outsiders’ and to control resources 
denied to others’ (Held, pp.171 & 185). To transcend these stratifying and 
exclusionary practices, Held determines that individuals can acquire 
autonomy via cosmopolitan democratic law, which is ‘a democratic public 
entrenched within and across borders’ (p.227).51  
The totalising nation state reached its zenith with the Nazi and Soviet 
regimes, which both promoted a ‘dominant conception of national identity’ 
(Linklater, 1998, p.7),
52
 but has been in steady decline as mass globalised 
immigration and movement have fragmented the domestic communities of 
nation states. Such globalisation and fragmentation ‘erode traditional 
conceptions of community and reduce the moral significance of national 
boundaries’ (Linklater, p.5). In terms of the citizen and denizen dichotomy, 
the nation state has lost its ethical foundation for preserving this 
stratification within the bounded political community. Moral responsibility 
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has shifted beyond the enclosed polis to those outside and to those inside but 
excluded. In the modern global era,  
 
‘one of the constitutive ethical principles of the sovereign state has lost its status 
as a self evident truth: this is the belief that the welfare of co-nationals takes 
precedence over the interests of aliens’ (Linklater, 2007, p.80). 
 
This thereby makes it no longer a utopian ideal ‘to imagine new forms of 
political community and new conceptions of citizenship which bind sub-
state, state and transnational society’ (Linklater, 1998, p.8). Exclusionary 
practices can be eroded by moral empathy and the formation of a dialogic 
community that places discourse at the top of its agenda.  
In the modern era, global networks of communication have made it 
much harder for nation states to control and regulate the political 
composition of their citizens and long-term residents, thereby, leading to a 
weakening of the totalising characteristic of the nation state structure. 
Certainly, as Yasemin Soysal (1994) writes:  ‘although nation-states still 
protect their membership by controlling the inflow of foreigners, an 
expanding range of rights and privileges is being granted to […] migrants, 
blurring the line between citizen and non-citizen’ (p.130). Soysal argues 
against T.H Marshall’s (1964) ‘rights’ sequence’53 by suggesting that the 
individual libertarian nature of civil and social rights delineates noticeably 
from political rights that still convey a collective and ‘symbolic meaning in 
terms of national sovereignty’ (p.131). Interestingly, this point may suggest 
the variation and discrepancy between social and political rights for 
immigrants within the Irish nation (and other European states).  However, 
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 Marshall’s (1964) model places rights acquisition in the sequence: civil, political and then social.  
Soysal believes that ‘the logic of personhood supersedes the logic of national 
citizenship’ (p.164) and that political rights can be transformed within the 
state into new modalities of postnational citizenship, which allow Muslim 
denizens within the Irish state to be recognized as political entities with 
national and transnational rights.
54
 
Linklater (1998) emphasises that one ‘should not underrate the power 
of the nation-state and its enduring capacity to rally support’ (p.33). 
Recognising the changing political environment, many European countries 
have allowed the once excluded – aliens and third country nationals – to vote 
in local elections. Although recent recruitment drives for electoral 
registering have been successful,
55
 it must be remembered that Irish local 
politics is significantly limited in relation to its European counterparts. 
Moreover, the important arena of the national electoral vote is still reserved 
for the full members of the political community and persistently blocked by 
extremely long citizenship application procedures that can take up to eight 
years (four to five years for the right to apply and then three years for the 
application to be processed). In the words of Issah Huseini of the New 
Communities Partnership, which aims to encourage immigrant registration 
and voting in the ROI, these barriers ‘reinforce the perception that 
immigrants are outsiders notwithstanding the number of years they’ve lived 
in the country’.56 Fundamentally, nation states have come to realise the need 
to entice the excluded denizen into the full political community (albeit 
within a timeframe regulated by the state authorities) by ensuring that the 
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existing social and political opportunity structures create a demand for full 
citizenship. This strategy allows the nation state to maintain control of the 
political community and transfer moral responsibility from the state to the 
individual choice of the excluded person.   
From a critical theory perspective, the exclusion of domiciled 
individuals from the national vote creates the entity of an ‘other’ and also 
fosters divisions within subaltern communities by demarcating sections 
within these communities as full citizens or non-citizens. Certainly, this 
exclusion does not rest easy with the modern cosmopolitan ethic of equality. 
Linklater (1998) disagrees with civic stratification via citizenship control. 
He suggests that ‘no individuals should be excluded by virtue of their class, 
nationality, ethnicity, sexual identity, gender or race from participating in 
decisions which impinge upon their welfare and interests’ (p.103).   
Overall, there are positive and negative incentives related to the move 
from being a denizen with cosmopolitan transnational associations to a full 
member of the Irish political community. In terms of Linklater’s post-
Westphalian theory, it could be said that the Irish nation-state, in order to 
preserve its own control and power over the political community, is actively 
promoting the transition from denizenship to citizenship. Therefore, instead 
of fulfilling its own moral obligations to humanity, the Irish nation state has 
moved the responsibility for exclusion to the excluded person. In other 
words, the denizen is given a choice between being a cosmopolitan 
transnational entity with limited rights and recognition or a full member of 
the Irish political community, who has full political rights and protection by 
default.
57
 Consequently, the Irish nation state is effectively absolved from 
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 It must be recognised that Muslims domiciled within the ROI may also be actively choosing to remain 
within the realm of denizenship. Roy (2004) has touched on this point by suggesting that Muslim groups 
any humanitarian and moral responsibility. Although aspects of state power 
are in decline, the Irish nation state remains in control of the political 
community and actively excludes denizens (i.e. individuals who have not 
declared their allegiance to the Irish state) from the full electoral process. 
Furthermore, if dual citizenship is unattainable, the policies of other nation 
states (i.e. an immigrant’s country of origin) may also inhibit the ability of a 
denizen from becoming part of the full political community within the 
receiving country.   
The question must be asked as to what effect does the restriction from 
the full political community have on denizens and their political 
participation? I would suggest that the exclusion of denizens from the full 
political community in the ROI refocuses political participation away from 
conventional political action such as voting and running for electoral office 
and into modes of unconventional participation that involve lobbying, street 
protestation and media discourse. Nonconventional forms of political action 
are generally collective and have national and transnational
58
 focus. Marco 
Martinello (2006) has emphasised that ‘relevant political participation 
cannot be reduced to electoral participation. Other forms such as trade union 
politics, association and community organisation have to be taken into 
                                                                                                                                                 
(particularly neo-fundamentalist groups) are actively promoting a de-territorialised existence that bypasses 
ethnic and national cleavages in order to develop a ‘pure’ unmediated form of Islam – an Islam that cannot 
be abused by the self-interest of nation states and can be identified as a ‘cosmopolitan’ Ummah.  Also, 
Baubock (1994) has stated that low naturalisation rates may be reflective of the fact that denizens enjoy 
many civil and social rights that full citizens enjoy (except for political rights).  
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 Transnationalism has been defined a process by which ‘immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded 
social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement […] many immigrants today build 
social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders’. See Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc-
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potentially concerns every aspect of a migrants’ life. Yet, the intensity of transnational political activity 
may vary substantially from one individual to another’ (Martinello & Lafleur, 2008, pp.648-649). 
account as well’ (p.86). Martinello and Lafleur (2008), developing on 
Østergaard-Nielsen’s (2003) transnational activity typology of homeland, 
immigrant and translocal politics, prefer not to design a category that risks 
giving ‘the impression that spaces of political action are clearly separated 
from one another’ (pp.652-653) and instead form a broad definition of 
immigrant political transnationalism. This definition states that: 
 
‘Immigrant political transnationalism covers any political activity undertaken by 
migrants who reside mainly outside their homeland and that is aimed at gaining 
political power or influence at the individual or collective level in the country of 
residence or in the state to which they consider they belong. Such power or 
influence may be achieved by interacting with all kinds of institutions (local, 
subnational, national or international) in the country of residence and/or the home 
country, by supporting movements that are politically active in the country of 
origin or by intervening directly in the country of origin’s politics’ (Martinello 
and Lafleur, pp.652-653).  
 
Notably, the Irish Times newspaper gives some indication of 
nonconventional political participation with national and transnational focus. 
For example, demonstrations and lobbying by Muslim groups in the ROI in 
relation to proposed banning of the veil in France; street protests by Islamic 
students against the Iraq occupation and use of Shannon airport as a U.S 
military stopover; further street protests against the cartoon depiction of 
Muhammad within various European newspapers (including the 
reproduction of the cartoon within the Irish tabloid – The Star); the lobbying 
of Irish banks to facilitate Islamic banking for the Irish Muslim community; 
and further lobbying of the Irish government and the European Union to 
intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Lebanese conflicts.
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Unfortunately, this point cannot be expanded further because newspaper 




It can be said that the Irish nation state is not morally righteous in its 
exclusion of denizens from the national vote and from automatic 
citizenship.
61
 In Linklater’s (1998) own words, ‘the boundaries of the 
political community have not coincided with the boundaries of the moral 
community’ (p.155). By this he is arguing that although governments are 
under no responsibility to admit persons hostile to the state or without regard 
to economic and social circumstances, overall, there is no moral reasoning 
that can explain the exclusion of persons from the political community 
simply due to their belonging or birth within another state (Linklater, pp.57 
& 80). 
It can therefore be stated that the Irish nation’s civic stratification of 
the Muslim community into denizens and citizens is morally indefensible. 
Ideally, the Irish nation should be prepared to involve everyone within its 
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 I hope to investigate the link between exclusion from the full political community and nonconventional 
national-transnational political action in the future by conducting a quantitative survey of a random sample 
of the Muslim population domiciled in the Dublin metropolitan area.  
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 Linklater’s cosmopolitan theory does seem to have a more anti-state and open position to the acquisition 
of citizenship than Benhabib (2004) who declares that:  ‘I have pleaded for moral universalism and 
cosmopolitan federalism. I have not advocated open but rather porous borders […and] have accepted the 
right of democracies to regulate the transition from first admission to full membership’ (p.221). Essentially, 
Benhabib calls for more adherence to human rights within the territorial boundaries of the state whilst 
Linklater asks for a moral discourse that will lead to a transcendence of the Westphalian state system.  
borders in the full political community. In other words, citizenship and the 
right to vote in all elections should be open to all and excluded to nobody. 
This suggests that the Irish nation should actively take steps to enlarge the 
boundaries of the moral and political community so that all affected parties - 
citizens and denizens - can work together as co-legislators (Linklater, 1998, 
p.84).  
 
Citizenship, throughout history, ‘has possessed its own forward momentum’ 
(Linklater, 1998, p.185) and ability to expand the boundaries of political 
community. In addition, the idea of citizenship has been continuously re-
articulated to give a political vote and voice to groups that had been at one 
time or another excluded from the circle of representation. Interestingly, the 
ROI has played an innovative lead role in extending citizenship rights in 
Europe. Ireland was one of the first countries to give denizens the local vote 
based on residence (ius domicili) instead of citizenship yet, in common with 
the majority of other European nations; it has stopped short of its moral 
commitment to open the boundaries to the national vote and automatic 
citizenship. Linklater (1998) describes restriction to citizenship as ‘a key 
weapon in the exercise of monopolising social privileges and opportunities’ 
(p.189).
62
 It may be suggested therefore that the Republic of Ireland, whilst 
allowing for some allowances to the post-modern era, is unwilling to give up 
its monopoly to citizenship and control of the full political community. In 
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fact, it is up to the denizen to make a political decision as to which camp to 
deposit his/her allegiance, whilst the nation state denies its own moral 
obligations to humanity. Therefore, the nation state maintains and receives 
political power by being the gate-keeper of rights. From a critical 
perspective, modern Ireland needs to come to terms with the tensions that 
exist within modern citizenship and its impact on subaltern communities 
domiciled within its borders. As Linklater has suggested: 
 
‘the modern idea of citizenship is laden with tensions and instabilities. On the one 
hand, citizenship embodies the right to freedom and equality which is the property 
of the whole of humanity; on the other hand, citizenship is invested in separate 
political communities which can happily purchase their own autonomy by 
limiting the freedom of others’ (1998, p.191).   
 
Realistically, how can so many diverging viewpoints be accommodated 
within a community with an open policy on the acquisition of citizenship? 
This is where Linklater’s theory freely mixes with the Habermasian idea of 
discourse ethics (Habermas 1989, p.82ff).  This idea suggests that a 
heterogeneous political community that is fully open to universal discourse 
can resolve societal issues and formulate equitable solutions. The 
Habermasian notion of true dialogue refers to a mutual reciprocal exchange 
whereby no person, group or moral position can be excluded from the 
dialogue in advance. In other words, the dialogue is an open and mutual 
process. Habermas (1990) succinctly described true dialogue as 
 
‘not a trial of strength between adversaries hell-bent on intellectual conquest, but 
an encounter in which human beings accept that there is no a priori certainty 
about who will learn from whom, and engage in a process of ‘reciprocal critique’ 
which is designed to create social arrangements which meet the consent of all’ 
(p.26). 
 
Logically, a political community that is committed to discourse ‘will be 
deeply concerned about the damaging effects of its actions on outsiders’ 
(Linklater, 1998, p.91). Participants within this mutual discourse agree to be 
guided by ‘the force of better argument’ (Habermas, 1990, pp.66 & 89) and 
understand that norms cannot be standardised until they receive the consent 
of those who stand to be affected by them (Habermas, 1989, p.82ff). 
Fundamentally, discourse ethics disrupts the perpetual norm of territorial 
sovereignty and of bounded political communities that reinforce exclusion of 
domiciled and external groups. It does this by problematising ‘all social 
boundaries, including the effects of bounded political communities on the 
members of other groups’ (Linklater, 2007, p.57). With this in mind, it is 
possible to conclude from a moral and humanistic perspective that Muslim 
denizens in the ROI should not be adversely restricted (by process or long 
periods of time) from the arena of the full political Irish community and the 
right to participate in important national elections which affect their 
everyday lives within the state.  Therefore, greater representation is not just 
given to outsiders of the bounded territory: ‘one must also envisage 
communities that recognize the claims of the culturally [and politically] 
marginal within their boundaries and promote their representation’ 
(Linklater, p.58). 
Furthermore, external political communities who are also affected by 
domestic realm policies and actions must be given an opportunity to join the 
discourse (i.e. immigrant sending states). This is confirmed by Seyla 
Benhabib (2004) who states that since ‘discourse theory articulates a 
universalist moral standpoint, it cannot limit the scope of the moral 
conversation only to those who reside within the nationally recognised 
boundaries; it must view moral conversation as potentially extending to all 
humanity’ (p.14). Benhabib confirms that the transforming of political 
community exclusion can be reduced through the deployment of juris-
generative acts, whose praxis is formulated on an iterative democratic 
process that ‘signals a space of interpretation and intervention between 
intranscendent norms and the will of democratic majorities’ (2004, p.181). 
Thus, making it possible for the Irish political majority to reassess and 
reinterpret existing exclusionary norms and in turn transform their political 
community in a more cosmopolitan direction. This point is confirmed by 
Benhabib when she states that  
 
‘Transformations of citizenship, through which rights are extended to individuals 
by virtue of residency rather than cultural identity, are the clearest forms of such 
cosmopolitan norms’ (2004, p.177). 
 
The dialogic process of development and the aim to rid the Irish state of 
systematic and institutional systems of exclusion, will begin the 
Habermasian process of moral-practical learning, which involves a 
‘willingness to question all social and political boundaries and all systems of 
inclusion and exclusion [and to ask…] whether the boundaries between 
insiders and outsiders can be justified by principles that are agreeable to all’ 
(Linklater, 2007, p.51). Producing these characteristics within all nation 
states can effectively led to the transformation of the political community 
and the transcending of the Westphalian state system, thereby, creating a 
international system devoid of perpetual anarchy and characterised by 
universal discourse and a concern for the other.  
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper shows that elements of 
the Muslim community are excluded from participating within the full 
political community in Ireland. This immoral exclusion may be refocusing 
denizen political participation into unconventional forms and redirecting 
political involvement into a more transnational direction. This has come 
about because the survival of the Irish nation state depends on maintaining 
its position as the gatekeeper of the political community, which 
consequently thereby restricts denizens from becoming fully functional 
political beings. The existence of denizens within nation states is proof that 
the globalised and fragmented post-modern world has come into being and 
that such a transformation of the international system is presenting 
contentious moral dilemmas for the existing Westphalian system. 
Ultimately, how will post-Westphalian citizenship change in terms of the 
pre-existing norm? Linklater declares that: 
 
‘Citizens of the post-Westphalian state […] can come under the jurisdiction of 
several political authorities; they can have multiple identities and they need not be 
united by bonds that make them either indifferent, or enemies of, the rest of the 
human race. The ‘Westphalian’ state defends national interests against outsiders 
and frequently takes little account of minority groups within its borders; the post-
Westphalian state can remove these moral deficits by striking a new balance 
between substate loyalties, traditional nation-state attachments and sphere of 
cosmopolitical identification’ (p.107). 
 
Critical theory proposes a further evolution of citizenship and a continued 
resistance to the closing of political boundaries. Neo-realists may criticise 
this constructivist viewpoint as idealist and utopian but the concluding 
words of Andrew Linklater’s seminal book The Transformation of Political 
Community can provide inspiration to challenge neo-realist certainties: 
 
‘Maybe visions of a humanity united in domination-free communication will 
always be utopian. But by unfolding their distinctive moral potentials, modern 
societies may yet prove capable of creating dialogic arrangements which are 
unique in the history of world political organisation. Realising the promise of the 
post-Westphalian era is the essence of the unfinished project of modernity’ 
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